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PRACTICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES
Jay M. Feinman*

Richard Posner's recent article entitled The Jurisprudence ofSkepticism 1 highlights a new wave of legal scholarship. Every intellectual
movement needs a name; because of the new wave's use of "practical
reason" 2 and because of its odd link with Critical Legal Studies, 3 I
suggest that this scholarly movement may now formally be called the
Practical Legal Studies (PLS) movement. Practical Legal Studies expressly abandons the goals of certainty, formal accuracy, and formal
legitimacy in legal decisionmaking in favor of more fluid techniques of
reasoning and argumentation. Because the PLS movement has now
achieved such stature, it is time to begin the inevitable process of analyzing the movement's philosophy, its place in American jurisprudence, and the motivations and attitudes of its adherents - the same
process to which Critical Legal Studies has been subject. 4 As Posner
says, it also is important to distinguish this approach from "radical
skeptics in the critical legal studies movement" (p. 829). While there
are differences within PLS (pp. 837-38, 847-48, 887-88), it is appropriate to begin with Posner, a dominant figure in any enterprise that he
undertakes. 5
The basic questions that Practical Legal Studies confronts are how
judges decide cases and how judges should decide cases. 6 The traditional analytic response to these questions has been that judges apply
formal methods of legal reasoning, and the formal methods sufficiently
comport with the courts' role in the political structure to provide legitimacy. That response has been untenable for a generation or more;

* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden, N.J.- Ed. My thanks to Rudy Pcritz
for his comments.
1. 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988). All subsequent references will be enclosed in parentheses in
the text.
2. See infra text following note 8.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 21-27.
4. See, e.g., Symposium on Critical Legal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 {1985); Critical
Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. I (1984).
5. Posner's article and the other PLS literature deal with a number of related issues; this
comment addresses only the question of judicial decisionmaking.
6. For a useful introduction,' see Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification:
Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985).
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thus PLS has moved to informal legal reasoning as a description of
adjudication and as a source of legitimacy.
Posner presents a two-part response to the questions. First, judges
can relatively easily arrive at the correct decision in many cases by
applying either some form of "exact inquiry" or of "practical reason."
Second, some indeterminate cases remain in which the correct result is
unavailable through these methods; the judge's job in those cases is to
apply policy analysis to reach results which are reasonable, if not demonstrably correct.
The techniques by which most legal disputes are solved are exact
inquiry and practical reason. Exact inquiry includes the methods traditionally associated with formal reasoning, particularly syllogistic
and enthymematic logic and scientific observation. Courts use less rigorous versions of these methods than logicians do, but the methods as
applied are adequate to solve many cases. For example, where an applicable rule, its validity, and the facts to which it is to be applied are
clear, logic (or something that resembles it) is enough for the court to
reach a correct result.
In other cases practical reason is required. Practical reason is defined as "the methods that people who are not credulous - who have
inquiring minds - use to form beliefs about matters that cannot be
verified by logic or exact observation" (p. 838). The "grab bag" of
methods of investigation and persuasion includes anecdote, introspection, common sense, intuition, and - especially relevant to law authority, reasoning by analogy, interpretation, means-end rationality,
tacit knowledge, and the test of time. "Miscellaneous and unrigorous
it may be, but practical reason is our principal set of tools for answering questions large and small" (pp. 838-39). In law, practical reason is
usually adequate to achieve a high degree of certainty about the correct results in cases.
However, some difficult and controversial cases defy resolution
even by practical reason. In these cases, there is no distinctive form of
legal reasoning available, and the judge must apply policy analysis,
which Posner presents as a four-step process. First, the judge draws
from all available data a concept of the relevant field of law. The data
useful for this purpose include legal texts such as cases and legislative
history, the characteristics of legal institutions, and, "lacking definitive
guidance from these sources, ... a social vision as well" (p. 863). Second, the judge canvasses the pertinent precedents and other sources,
legal and nonlegal, for information that may help decide the case.
Third, based on this information, the judge makes a policy judgment
about the applicability of the concept to the present case. Finally, he
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returns to the precedents to assure that the policy judgment is reasonably consistent with them.
Posner states that this approach describes "the actual (though
often implicit) reasoning process that good judges use in the tough
cases" (p. 863). Depending on the "social vision" and "the policy
judgments, political preferences, and ethical values of the judges" (p.
828) in the particular case, more than one result "would be equally
likely to be pronounced correct by an informed, impartial observer"
(p. 828). In the difficult case, therefore, the judge's goal cannot be to
reach a right result but only a reasonable one.
Thus, in Posner's view there are easy cases and hard cases, each
amenable to treatment by different, equally legitimate methods. A
common thread runs through the discussion of the different methods,
however. Some easy cases can be solved syllogistically because the
meaning, the applicability, and the validity of a doctrine are "clear"
(p. 890). Other cases are solved through "practical" reasoning. And
hard cases can still yield "reasonable" results through the application
of policy analysis. The common thread is that each of these terms clear, practical, reasonable - invokes a dominant political ideology as
a basis for the methods of reasoning and their legitimacy.
The point can be made by considering the meaning of "practical"
reason. Practical reason as a mode of thinking and rhetoric has an
ancient lineage, but its modern uses in law are somewhat removed
from that tradition. 7 Practical reason today encompasses a variety of
everyday techniques of thinking. But what distinguishes a method of
practical reason from ·what might be called "impractical irreason"?
Why is means-tmd rationality useful in deciding a case while reading
the entrails of a goat or trial by ordeal is not? The distinguishing feature, of course, is our society's judgment about the utility and rationality of the former methods, and the uselessness and irrationality of the
latter. That judgment is based on beliefs about human rationality and
the inaccessibility of divine guidance. In short, societal conventions
establish what is "practical," just as they establish what is "clear" or
"reasonable. "8
Focusing on social conventions suggests that Posner's use of "practical" in the phrase "practical reason" resonates with many familiar,
7. Practical reason is a faculty defined within the Aristotelian tradition. As Mark Tushnet
points out, however, the social preconditions for an Aristotelian exercise of practical reason are
unavailable to us. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1502, 1534-36 (1985).
8. Posner distinguishes himself from the scholars he calls the new conventionalists, but the
distinction appears to turn on the extent of the commitment to conventions as the source of
reason; all PLS scholars place considerable reliance on convention.
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nontechnical uses of the term. For example, CLS scholars are not being "practical" when they suggest utopian reorganizations of law
school or radical transformations of doctrine, or when they criticize
law and legal thought without immediately proposing an alternative.
In public life, it is not "practical" to vote for Jesse Jackson (or Eugene
McCarthy, or Pat Robertson) for president, because a Black (or peace
candidate, or fundamentalist Christian) "can't" win. And it's not
"practical" to divest of investments in South Africa, or to engage in
civil disobedience to achieve desegregation in the South, or to cease
the deployment of nuclear weapons unilaterally, and so on.
What "practical" means, in general, is that the view espoused conforms to the prevailing political ideology. In all of these particular
contexts, to be "practical" means that any action proposed or taken
must conform to the currently dominant ideology that frames the issues, and that any view that lies outside the political mainstream is by
definition not "practical." Thus, any action within the political mainstream is "reasonable"; while "reasonable people can differ" about
judgments within the mainstream, it is "unreasonable" to be outside
the mainstream. Further, "unreasonable" is often used synonymously
with a pejorative sense of the term "political." This explains how Posner can acknowledge that judges must use their political preferences in
making some decisions (p. 828), while denying that most decisions those arrived at through practical reason - are "political" (p. 840). 9
Of course, a dominant ideology is neither unitary nor capable of
precise definition, and subscribing to the ideology does not mean supporting "the status quo" in a crude sense. 10 Moreover, in particular
areas of endeavor, such as legal discourse, the ideology takes distinctive forms. One branch of PLS focuses on "the special traditions of
the legal profession" as a source of conventional understanding (pp.
886-87), but "conventional understanding" is simply another way of
describing ideology.
The inability to delineate the ideology precisely does not deny its
existence or its impact. 11 The ideology can be evoked by familiar
catch-phrases: 12 an economy of regulated capitalism; a democratic,
9. The same association of unreasonableness and politics appears in academics when leftist
tenure candidates can be criticized either for being "political" or on a "nonpolitical" scholarly
basis, while their critics remain "reasonable" and "nonpolitical." See Frug, McCarthyism and
Critical Legal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665 (1987).
10. Accordingly, Practical scholars of various political stripes can comfortably fit within the
movement. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
11. Posner might suggest that knowledge of the ideology is available through the exercise of
practical reason.
12. Because PLS is, as Posner says, "skeptical," all of these terms should be qualified by the
term "relatively."
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pluralist polity; a meritocratic yet egalitarian social order; an autonomous, functional legal process; and a unitary but hierarchical bar.
The dominant ideology also has implicit personal characteristics:
white, male, elite, and rational. The concept of "different voices" is by
now familiar in legal scholarship 13 (though not universally accepted by
any means), and this dominant ideology is a voice which permeates
the PLS literature. 14 A particularly telling instance of this is the image
Posner presents of the practical, skeptical judge. His model judge deliberates on issues using the best tools available, imperfect though they
may be; in the most controversial cases, the judge coolly applies Posner's four-step policy analysis. We have seen this skeptical judge, this
deliberative decisionmaker, somewhere before. He is, I suggest, a
close relative of the rational calculator who is the personification of
the economic analysis of law. The skeptical judge has the same qualities of careful calculation and knowledge of self and situation that
characterize economic man.
Much of the source of power in the dominant ideology is revealed
by this type of personification. The skeptical judge and the sources on
which he draws are presented as entities that exist in the world. Who
can dispute the authority of the deliberative, skeptical judge? How
can we disagree with the "reasonableness" of a decision as assessed by
"an informed, impartial observer" (p. 88)? Indeed, what alternative is
there to being "practical"?
Unfortunately, all of this is reification. What is "practical" is a
political choice, but a choice that is hidden behind seemingly neutral
terms, concepts, and images. Thus, PLS scholars may argue that there
simply is no alternative to the reliance on convention and the use of
the techniques Posner outlines. That narrow vision, however, is simply a consequence of the focus on supporting established institutions
of power. In fact, it is entirely possible for judges to be impractical, or
Critical - that is, to confront the dominant ideology - and not just
skeptical.
When stated at a general level, the process of Critical legal decisionmaking is not easy to distinguish from Practical legal decisionmaking. Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey define some fundamental
characteristics of PLS as
a concern for history and context; a desire to avoid abstracting away the
human component in judicial decisionmaking; an appreciation of the
13. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); Matsuda, Looking to
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
14. The Critical literature is not immune, either. See Symposium, Minority Critiques of tire
Critical Legal Studies Movemellt, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987).
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complexity of life;" some faith in dialogue and deliberation; a. tolerance
for ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a skepticism of
rigid dichotomies; and an overall humility. 15

Many Critical scholars would accept the same characteristics,
although their content might vary. "A concern for history and context" might simply mean complexity to a Practical scholar, where it
suggests dialectical materialism16 or Foucaultian genealogy 17 to a Critical scholar. "Skepticism of rigid dichotomies" may mean Posnerian
skepticism about intangible concepts or it may mean critical deconstruction.18 "The human component in deCisionmaking" could be
Realist recognition of the individuality of the judge or a phenomenological analysis stressing the power of preconscious social
conventions. 19
Thus, there are disciplinary differences between practical and impractical approaches, but the real key may be the singer, not the song.
What is required for Critical judging (and Critical scholarship) is to be
"unreasonable" with precisely the connotation that term c;arries in
Posner's usage: to proceed from a radically different political perspective, with a sense that legal conventions are problematic. Any general
description of methodology will fail to capture this essential distinction, which can only be apprehended by the exercise, not of practical
reason, but of one's sense of personal and political connection with
like-minded others. This faculty is something akin to elements of Posner's grab-bag of practical reason - anecdote, intuition, empathy but, as with the larger issue, the description of the process fails to
capture our experience of it. 20
The fundamental political difference between CLS and PLS, like
the broad and potent definitions of such terms as "reasonable," "practical," and "political," explains the wide range of political and intellectual beliefs represented in the Practical Legal Studies movement.
15. Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615,
1646 (1987), quoted i11 Posner, supra note 1, at 887. Posner criticizes this description as too ad
hoc and discretionary. Id.
16. See, e.g., Holt, Recovery by the Worker Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream,
Legal Realist, and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a Problem of Nineteenth Century Contract
Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 677.
.
17. See, e.g., Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985).
18. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 25 (1980).
20. For examples of the critical alternative to reasonableness, see Feinman, A Case Study in
Crirical Comract Law, 1987 ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming); Kennedy, Freedom and Conslrailll in Adjudication: A Crilical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1986); Singer, The
Reliance [/llerest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988); R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT 43-90 (1986).
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Many PLS scholars defy characterization as liberal or conservative; a
representative list includes such diverse figures as Anthony
Kronman, 21 Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey,22 Steve Shiffrin, 23 Cass
Sunstein, 24 and Posner. It would be banal to state that all of these
scholars share a commitment to the prevailing legal and political order, more or less; most legal scholars, including some Critical scholars,
could be described in that way. More to the point, all of these scholars
lack an association with an extensive critique of the prevailing legal
and political order - that is, with the Critical Legal Studies
movement.
Accordingly, we can situate the rise of Practical Legal Studies
within the historical development of American jurisprudence. In The
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, Posner suggests that lawyers ought to do
away with inchoate and unverifiable concepts such as intent and simply focus on observable behavior (pp. 866-71). Pursuing that thought,
we need not impute to PLS scholars the conscious motive of confronting CLS. Instead, two interlocking behavioral explanations account for the rise of Practical Legal Studies. An observation of human
behavior is that people respond, often dramatically, when the ideas
that give meaning to their lives are threatened. Critical Legal Studies
challenges many of the things that constitute the psychological and
professional identity of legal academics, so their response is understandable. While CLS has been scorned and derided, at least within
the legal academy it has had a profoundly disquieting impact in undermining the accepted modes of legal discourse. One response has been
simply to attempt to remove the critics. 25 For more thoughtful and
committed scholars, a different response has been to build an intellectual defense. The defense could not rest on some archaic formalism,
so PLS scholars have attempted to erect new fortifications to the
citadel.
From a historical perspective, the PLS response to the CLS challenge follows a familiar pattern of radical challenge and traditionalist
response in American legal thought, as in other branches of intellec21. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987); Kronman, Alexander
Bicke/'s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
22. Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 1615; Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987). A useful bibliography of some of the PLS literature is
provided in Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 1645 n.129.
23. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and
Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. I 103 (1983).
24. Sunstein, Legal Interferences with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986);
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
25. See Frug, supra note 9.
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tual life. The Legal Realists provoked a response from natural law
theorists and process jurisprudence,26 for example, and now the pattern repeats itself.
Thus PLS in all its forms can be viewed as a liberal/moderate/
conservative response to the radicalism of Critical Legal Studies.
However, this line of thought should not be taken too seriously. Critical legal history is not limited to simple behavioral accounts. Instead,
a common critical account involves complex economic, social, and
psychological webs out of which historical actors attempt to find
meaning. 27 From this perspective, Practical Legal Studies is more
than a simple response to Critical Legal Studies; it is an attempt by
many legal intellectuals to find their place in the modern world.
In this respect it is interesting to return to Posner himself. Because
of Posner's association with (or dominance of) law and economics, in
some circles "Posnerian" has been a pejorative adjective connoting
great intellect, narrowly focused. His more· recent scholarship shatters
that perception. The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, added to his other
recent contributions to diverse fields, 28 assures recognition of Posner's
wide-ranging and creative scholarship. The problems facing modern
legal intellectuals defy solution on traditional grounds, and law and
economics is clearly too confining a tradition for Posner. The further
step that needs to be taken is to recognize, as well, the confinement
imposed by Practical Legal Studies' association with the dominant tradition in politics.

26. See G. WHITE, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136 (1978).
27. The basic account is Gordon, Critical L.egal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). See
also Holt, supra note 16. For an unusual example, see Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A
Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373.
28. E._g., R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).

